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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this report, we are going to discuss the changes affecting the judicial review of 
administrative action in Hungarian administrative law which have followed from Hungary’s 
membership in the European Union and in the European Convention on Human Rights. We 
aim to identify the areas where pressures of legal convergence have emerged from European 
obligations. We also seek to explore what factors may lead to resisting the domestication of 
European influences. We are concerned specifically with European influences on the doctrine 
and practice of judicial review in Hungary and also with the question of whether European 
requirements could be adequately grafted onto the applicable domestic constitutional 
framework. The application of European law has now become an everyday exercise for 
Hungarian administrative authorities and courts, and domestic and European principles and 
doctrine now together determine the judicial supervision of administrative decisions. 
Although the article discusses matters that are specific to Hungarian administrative law, the 
dilemmas addressed have also emerged in other jurisdictions and, therefore, have a more 
general relevance. 
 With Hungary’s 2004 entry into the European Union, public authorities were 
confronted with the novel task of applying and enforcing directly effective and directly 
applicable substantive and procedural provisions of EU law, the breach of EU law became a 
ground for establishing the illegality of administrative decisions, and the rights and principles 
following from EU law had to be taken into account in determining procedure and remedies 
before administrative authorities and courts. Since 1992, Convention rights, Articles 6 and 8 
ECHR in particular, have formulated important legal benchmarks for administrative 
procedures and for courts proceeding in judicial review. In Hungarian administrative law, the 
process of legal adaptation to European requirements has led to controversial and 
constitutionally problematic developments. First, domestic administrative law, as other 
administrative laws in Europe, has been divided into separate domains where European and 
where domestic law is applied depending on the circumstances of individual cases.
1
 This 
duplication of administrative law under European influence is most problematic when the 
applicable domestic and European principles and doctrine are different and there is a 
possibility, questionable under the rule of law, that similar cases will be decided differently 
under different bodies of law. Second, domestic administrative law relying on legitimate 
constitutional and doctrinal reasons is inclined to resist certain changes induced by the 
Europeanization process. The application of the principle of proportionality following from 
EU and ECHR law in the judicial review of administrative discretion appears to contradict the 
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domestic principles determining the limits of the supervisory jurisdiction exercised by courts 
in judicial review in Hungarian law. In such circumstances, the resolving of tensions between 
domestic and European law requires the reassessment of law and doctrine on the domestic 
level. It needs to be examined, in particular, whether in light of European requirements 
domestic law and doctrine is sufficiently developed and whether the constitutional regulation 
of judicial review in Hungary needs to be reformed. 
 Arguably, these dilemmas could represent a case for furthering the influence of 
European law in Hungarian administrative law. Restoring the coherence of domestic 
administrative law and re-introducing economy and simplicity in the application of the law, in 
order to avoid the confusion and inequality caused by the duplication of the law, could require 
a legal spill-over from the law followed in European cases to the law applied in ordinary 
domestic cases. The reinstatement of the complete influence of traditional domestic doctrine 
is no longer viable. This, however, assumes a voluntary accommodation of European 
influences in domestic law, beyond the actual obligations following from law, and it 
necessitates a commitment from domestic actors to consider in a bottom-up process how 
European requirements could be integrated into domestic law. This latter needs to be 
integrated into a general overview of domestic administrative law and doctrine. The 
accommodation of European principles, such as the principle of proportionality, requires the 
adjustment of the constitutional doctrines of judicial review and Hungarian courts alone seem 
unwilling to undertake that task without explicit constitutional and legislative authorization. 
Change is inevitable as resisting, or delaying, the application and proliferation of European 
principles in purely domestic areas of administrative law would conserve a constitutionally 
unsustainable situation. 
 In Hungary, judicial review and administrative justice constitutes an area markedly 
distinct, as a matter of doctrine and practice, from civil or criminal justice. Its central purpose 
is to enable the control of the legality of administrative decisions by ordinary courts. The 
procedure for judicial review is regulated in separate provisions in the Code on Civil 
Procedure and, at first instance, jurisdiction for judicial review is given to separately 
organized administrative courts.
2
 In the later phases of the procedure, jurisdiction is exercised 
by the administrative chambers of higher ordinary courts. The judicial control of the 
administration is regarded as a concrete manifestation of the separation of powers doctrine 
recognized in the Hungarian constitution which gives a special constitutional position to 
administrative justice within the Hungarian justice system. Under the current constitutional 
arrangements, the Constitutional Court is endowed with competence to control the 
compatibility of judicial decisions, including those delivered in administrative cases, with the 
Fundamental Law. 
The recently adopted new Fundamental Law of Hungary has made the supervisory 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts more complete on the constitutional level. The Curia, the 
highest ordinary court of the country, was given the jurisdiction, which previously had been 
exercised by the Constitutional Court, to control the legality of legislation adopted by local 
authorities. The next step in this process, if it is regarded as a process of constitutional reform, 
could be the extension of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Curia to all legislation adopted by 
the executive including legislation (regulations) passed by the government, by ministries, or 
by regulatory agencies. This change would lead to a novel distribution of functions between 
the judiciary and the Constitutional Court in which ordinary courts supervise both legislation 
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and administrative action by the executive and the Constitutional Court exercises its powers 
of constitutional review with regards legislation adopted by Parliament. 
The Hungarian system also contains non-regular avenues of legal redress against 
administrative decisions. These include trespassing cases where the legal office (the chief 
legal officer) of local authorities (“jegyző”) decides at first, which decision can then be 
challenged before first instance courts proceeding in civil matters. Their separate treatment is 
explained by the fact that the decision of the local authority affects matters of property and, 
therefore, full jurisdiction must be made available for the first instance court to re-examine the 
case on the basis of property law. The purpose of the procedure before the legal office of the 
local authority is to ensure that expedient legal redress is available against trespassers. 
Subsequent judicial involvement ensures that a complete legal re-examination of the 
administrative decision is offered to individuals before a court of law. 
Public authorities may also proceed in cases involving minor criminal offences 
(misdemeanours) (“szabálysértés”), the decisions in which are typically open to challenge 
before first instance criminal courts. Upon its accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Hungary submitted a reservation regarding the exemption of these 
administrative decisions from judicial review.
3
 The reservation was in force until the 1999 re-
regulation of the area,
4
 which was again re-regulated in 2011,
5
 when in compliance with the 
ECHR judicial review was made available against decisions brought by public authorities in 
this area. In Hungarian law, administrative decisions concerning minor criminal offences and 
its judicial control are not regarded as constituting part of the system of administrative justice. 
They are distinguished from ordinary administrative cases, for instance, from the imposition 
of penalties for the breach of requirements laid down in administrative law on the basis of the 
different concepts of legal responsibility used in the two areas. While in minor criminal cases 
responsibility is established on the basis of categories used in criminal law, such as criminal 
intent and criminal negligence, administrative responsibility is based on a more objective and 
perhaps less developed system of responsibility. There are no further major doctrinal 
differences and the distinction whether a breach of law will fall under administrative law or 
under the law of minor criminal offences depends on the discretion of the legislator. In recent 
years, there was a considerable shift towards reclassifying minor criminal offences as 
administrative offences.
6
 The most significant change in this regard was the de-
criminalization of road and traffic offences, which are now subject to an objective (strict) 
system of administrative sanctioning. The rationale of the modification was that it had been 
nearly impossible to prove subjective/individual responsibility for the majority of these 
offences. Under the current system, the objective administrative fine can be imposed not only 
on the driver but, in case the driver remains unidentifiable, also on the owner of the motor 
vehicle without the public authority being required to prove which person committed the 
offence. Neither trespassing cases, nor cases involving minor criminal offences are examined 
in this article as part of the Hungarian system of judicial review of administrative decisions. 
In the following, we are going to focus on three problem areas within the broader 
theme of the Europeanization of judicial review in Hungary. They involve domains where 
domestic doctrine appears to be in contradiction with European influences and where the legal 
disjunction of ordinary and European segments of domestic administrative law is a genuine 
possibility. These are the right to a fair administrative process, the right of access to judicial 
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 For instance, the violation of smoking regulations is now an administrative offence. 
review, and the judicial review of the use of administrative discretion, in particular, by means 
of the proportionality principle. We are going to concentrate on the influences emerging from 
EU membership and from the ECHR which have had broader doctrinal implications. We are 
not going to address the changes introduced following ECHR requirements which affected 
individual cases or particular areas of Hungarian administrative law. Before addressing these 
issues, however, we need to provide a short introduction to the law and doctrine of judicial 
review of administrative action in Hungarian law and we need to revisit the relevant European 
requirements. 
 
2 THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN HUNGARY 
 
According to Article XXVIII paragraph 7 of the Chapter of the Hungarian Fundamental Law 
on ‘Freedom and responsibility’, every person has a right to legal redress against judicial and 
administrative decisions which violate his or her rights or legitimate interests. This provision 
provides the constitutional foundation of the judicial review of administrative action in 
Hungary. The Hungarian system of administrative justice is operated by ordinary courts on 
three distinct layers of jurisdiction. General first instance jurisdiction in administrative cases 
is exercised by the 20 administrative courts, which as mentioned earlier are distinct from 
ordinary civil and criminal courts only in their organization. Appeal to appeal courts is 
allowed only in a special group of cases, indicated below, where decisions are reached in a 
single instance administrative procedure. Against the first instance and the appeal judgments, 
extraordinary appeal on questions of law may be submitted to the Curia (formerly called as 
the Supreme Court of Hungary) which will be examined by judicial chambers designated 
within the special administrative and employment law division of the Curia. The Curia is also 
endowed with the task of monitoring the practice of lower courts under its constitutional 
responsibility to maintain the uniformity of judicial practice in Hungary. 
 The statutory regulation of administrative procedure in Hungary
7
 recognizes, as a 
norm, that first instance administrative decision-making is followed by an appeal within the 
administration, which could then be challenged in judicial review in a single instance process. 
There is a special group of administrative cases where administrative decision-making takes 
place on a single instance (competition decisions of the Hungarian Competition Authority, 
decisions of the Hungarian National Bank on banking supervision, decisions of the Hungarian 
Public Procurement Authority, decisions of the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority, or the decisions of the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority) 
and the first instance court proceeding in judicial review is, as a result, provided with 
jurisdiction to reform the administrative decision. In such instances, appeal against the first 
instance judgment is available to the Budapest Metropolitan Court which is a regional court 
located in Budapest with appeal jurisdiction reserved for such matters. Its judgments may be 
challenged in extraordinary appeal before the Curia. 
 The Fundamental Law contains further provisions relevant for judicial review. Article 
XXIV paragraph 1 of the Chapter on ‘Freedom and responsibility’ holds that every person has 
the right to have his or her case decided by administrative authorities in a reasonable time in 
an impartial and fair procedure. This also includes the obligation of public authorities to 
provide reasons for their decisions, as determined in statute. This constitutional provision, 
which also appears in the Act on Administrative Procedures as the right to fair (good) 
administration,
8
 must be distinguished from the separate constitutional right to a fair judicial 
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process. The right to a fair judicial process is regulated by Article XXVIII paragraph 1 of the 
Fundamental Law as the right to have criminal charges against a person or civil rights and 
obligations determined within a reasonable period of time in a fair and open trial by an 
independent and impartial court established by law. The right to fair administration does not 
contain the requirement of independence and, arguably, its impartiality requirement operates 
with a lower threshold than that of the right to a fair judicial process. 
 Access to judicial review, as we saw earlier under Article XXVIII paragraph 7, is 
regulated in the Fundamental Law as the right to legal redress being available to every person 
the rights or legitimate interests of whom have been violated by a decision of an 
administrative authority. On the level of statutes, access to courts in administrative cases is 
regulated in the following manner. The Act on Administrative Procedures holds that parties to 
administrative procedures are persons the rights or legitimate interests of whom are affected 
by the case, who have been brought under administrative investigations, or regarding whom 
official databases contain data.
9
 The same statute also provides that standing in judicial 
review to challenge administrative decisions before a court of law is available to the parties of 
the administrative procedure, or to any other participant in the procedure.
10
 The latter may 
only challenge components of the administrative decision which were addressed to him. There 
are a number of administrative procedures where the applicable statute narrows the general 
statutory definition of what persons constitute as parties to the administrative procedure. In 
such instances, standing in judicial review would also be allowed to those who under the 
specific statutory provisions do not but under the Act on Administrative Procedures would 
qualify as parties to the procedure. This follows from Article XXVIII paragraph 7 of the 
Fundamental Law which, as indicated above, provides the right to legal redress to every 
person the rights or legitimate interests of whom have been violated by an administrative 
decision. 
 The law recognizes an important difference between the scope of appeal to the second 
instance administrative authority and the scope of judicial review. In the appeal, the party may 
make submissions on any relevant matter, including the illegality of the administrative 
decision, which does not affect him or her directly, or which does not violate his or her rights 
or legitimate interests. The abuse of discretion by the public authority or matters of 
expediency may also be raised. In contrast, in a claim for judicial review the party may only 
raise matters of administrative illegality which directly violates his or her rights or legitimate 
interests. This distinction was recognized by the courts in the formula that although the 
individual may have a right of access to judicial review, he or she may not have standing in 
judicial review in all matters raised.
11
 In general, the narrow interpretation of the scope of 
judicial review and the relevant standing requirements could prevent the effective judicial 
control of the administration, which is particularly problematic in Hungary where the current 
interpretative approach of courts, depending on the circumstances of the case, could be 
regarded as overly restrictive.
12
 
 As in other jurisdictions, the scope and intensity of judicial review is a matter of 
constitutional importance and the relevant doctrines and principles of administrative law are 
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based directly on constitutional principles and rules. The relevant judicial practice in Hungary 
acknowledges the constitutional relevance of judicial review and for this reasons courts 
exercise the jurisdiction available to them with restraint. The strict observance of the 
constitutional boundaries of judicial review by courts could, however, undermine the interest 
of the effective judicial control of the administration and it may jeopardize the right to 
effective judicial redress. It has been suggested that a strict approach towards the review of 
legality cannot be regarded as ensuring the effective review of administrative discretion.
13
 The 
strict constitutional approach of Hungarian courts also faces a challenge from EU law. In the 
judicial review of decisions of national regulatory agencies overseeing regulated markets, the 
regulatory and administrative activities of which are based on EU law, following the practice 
of other national courts Hungarian courts are required to observe a general obligation to 
ensure the effectiveness of judicial control and the extend their scrutiny to questions of 
legality, fact and policy.
14
 
 As a matter of scope, in Hungarian law, the judicial review of the legality of 
administrative action covers both breaches of procedural and substantive law and it excludes 
the review (the judicial reconsideration) of matters belonging to the merit of the 
administrative decision brought under direct statutory or under discretionary powers. The 
scope of judicial review is further restricted by the principle that the illegality of 
administrative decisions following from a breach of procedural provisions may only be 
established if that breach had an impact on the merits of the decision.
15
 We will return to this 
latter question below when we discuss the impartiality and fairness requirements imposed on 
administrative procedures. 
In light of the requirement of effective judicial redress against administrative action, 
the most contentious issue in Hungarian judicial practice has been the interpretation of the 
constitutional limit (prohibition) on courts to examine in judicial review matters belonging to 
the merits of the administrative decision brought under discretionary powers. As it follows 
from the relevant statutory provisions and as acknowledged by courts, discretionary decisions 
by public authorities will be lawful when the public authority has managed to establish the 
facts of the case adequately, it has observed the relevant procedural requirements, it has taken 
into account in the use of discretionary powers transparent and relevant considerations, and 
the administrative decision delivered is reasonable as indicated in the reasons provided by the 
public authority.
16
 In order to explore the meaning of this formula, we first need to discuss the 
underlying principles and theoretical considerations. 
 In Hungarian administrative law, the discretionary powers available to public 
authorities follow direct authorization based on legislation. These include legislative 
provisions which enable a choice for administrative authorities between different decisional 
routes under the same factual circumstances. The legislative determination of the 
discretionary powers available to public authorities is a requirement under the rule of law. It 
includes, in particular, that legislation must spell out the boundaries of the discretion available 
and that it must indicate the considerations which need to be taken into account by public 
authorities acting under discretionary powers.
17
 It also follows from the rule of law that 
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making legally unlimited discretion available for administrative bodies must be avoided and 
that the availability of broad discretionary powers must be restricted to instances where it is 
absolutely necessary.
18
 
Generally, the use of discretionary powers by public authorities is guided by 
considerations recognized as relevant in legislation. These usually follow from terms used in 
legislative provisions, for instance, terms like ‘rational’, ‘guilty’, ‘unfair’, or ‘relevant’.19 The 
use of these terms enables integrating regulatory principles and objectives into the 
interpretation and application of legislative provisions by public authorities. In case 
legislation does not identify the considerations relevant for the use of discretionary powers, 
public authorities remain bound by the fundamental rules of logic and their decisions must be 
reasonable (“okszerű”). For instance, when only broad parameters are given for administrative 
sanctions, the imposition of the sanction must follow the legislative parameters and it must 
also be reasonable (it must be reasonable within the applicable legislative parameters). In 
other words, in Hungarian doctrine the use of discretionary powers will be lawful when public 
authorities decide according to the relevant legislative provisions and their decision is the 
most appropriate in the particular circumstances of the given case. 
In Hungarian administrative law, the discretion of public authorities covers not only 
questions of law but also the assessment of evidence. This latter refers to the ability of public 
authorities, made available in legislation, to choose under the same evidence submitted to it 
between different decisional routes in the determination of the facts of the case. Before 
administrative authorities, just as in case of courts of law, the system of evidence is based on 
the free assessment of evidence. The public authority examines every piece of evidence 
individually and in relation with each other, and makes its assessment within its own 
discretion. This does not allow complete decisional freedom – public authorities are allowed 
discretionary powers only within the boundaries determined by the law of evidence.
20
 
In this regard, we need to distinguish between the discretionary and the non-
discretionary assessment of evidence by public authorities. In the latter case, public 
authorities are not provided alternative decisional routes and they are bound to establish a 
certain fact on the basis of a certain piece of evidence. When pieces of evidence contradict 
each other, public authorities must follow the statutory provisions of the law of evidence.
21
 In 
case the contradiction remains unresolved on the basis of statutory provisions, the public 
authority may assess the evidence within its discretionary powers. The discretionary 
assessment of evidence works in the same way as the use of discretionary powers in the 
application of the law to decide individual cases. The only differences are that the power is 
made available to assess the evidence collected to establish the case, instead of discretion 
being used to decide the case on the basis of the law, and that the relevant considerations 
guiding the use of discretion are not provided by substantive administrative law but by the law 
of evidence. In both instances, the use of discretionary powers by the public authority must 
comply with the requirements of rationality, in other words, it must be reasonable. 
                                                          
18 It must be noted that Hungarian legal terminology uses the term ‘discretion’ (“diszkrecionális”) to describe 
instances where the decisional liberty of administrative bodies is legally unlimited. Discretionary decisions are 
decisions when legislation enables public authorities to make contradicting decisions under similar factual 
circumstances, and both decisions will be lawful. This is common in competition law when the relevant general 
legal concepts enable recognizing contradicting but equally valid economic rationales for a conduct, one of 
which would support declaring the conduct of undertakings illegal and the other lawful. 
19
 In competition law, such concepts are ‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’ in pricing, or ‘demand-side substitutionality’. 
20
 This also follows from the fact that the relevant legal provisions do not include the term ‘free’ before the word 
‘discretion’ (‘meggyőződés’) as in Article 206 Paragraph 1 of the Code on Civil Procedure, applicable to courts, 
and in Article 50 Paragraph 6 in Act 2004:CXL, applicable to public authorities. 
21 For instance, the legal provisions on the burden of proof and the weight of evidence. 
In practice, the use of discretionary powers to decide an administrative case and to 
establish the facts of a case on the basis of the evidence available may be difficult to 
distinguish. The relevant procedural rules, the Code on Civil Procedure, recognize two types 
of questions of fact: simple facts and facts the determination of which requires expert 
knowledge. Their separation is often controversial, and in special areas of law, such as 
competition law and the law of regulated markets, where economics-based evidence is used, 
in many instances it is unclear whether the public authority has to assess a question of expert 
evidence or a question of law. 
 The constitutional boundaries of the judicial review of administrative action are based 
on the prohibition for courts to substitute the assessment of the public authority on matters of 
substance with their own. The prohibition is a manifestation of the legal principle that 
administrative decisions may only be subject to judicial review on grounds of illegality. While 
in procedures for appeal within the administration or before courts interference with the merit 
of (discretionary) decisions is allowed, the limitation of review to questions of illegality is a 
characteristic of extraordinary legal redresses including, from this perspective, judicial 
review. The same applies to extraordinary appeals before the Curia where judicial decisions 
may only be reviewed on grounds of unlawfulness. In the limited circumstances when appeal 
is available against judicial decisions brought in judicial review, for example when the 
judgment brought by the Budapest Metropolitan Court in judicial review against the decision 
of the Competition Authority is open to appeal before the Curia, that appeal will be restricted 
to questions of illegality in the same way as the original application for judicial review. 
 The dividing line between the review of legality and the review of the merits of the 
case, however, is not always clear in Hungarian law. The appeal before the second instance 
administrative body covers questions of legality, procedure and facts, and it also includes 
matters of expediency. This latter is regarded as enabling the superior public authority to 
interfere with the merits of the (discretionary) decision brought at first instance. Questions of 
expediency are, however, often inseparable from the rationality and the reasonableness of 
administrative decisions. Therefore, it is not excluded that during the judicial control of the 
use of discretionary powers courts, trespassing unintentionally the boundaries of their 
jurisdiction, examine matters of expediency. A similar problem emerges in connection with 
the review of evidence and the ordering of a further examination of evidence in judicial 
review. Arguably, the fact that judicial review is restricted to the examination of illegality 
should not exclude the review and further assessment of evidence by the reviewing court. Its 
effect is simply that it narrows down the usual parameters of the taking of evidence by courts. 
 According to Article 164(1) of the Code on Civil Procedure, the claim for judicial 
review may contain submissions regarding the incompatibility of the facts established by the 
administrative authority with the evidence collected (with the file), or submissions concerning 
the fact that the public authority has failed to determine the facts of the case adequately. This 
does not, however, enable the individual to challenge the assessment of the evidence by the 
public authority within the discretionary powers made available in legislation. In case the 
public authority followed all procedural requirements and the rights of the defence were 
observed, only those pieces of evidence may be used in judicial review, which were omitted 
from the administrative procedure outside the fault of the party to the procedure. Only in 
special circumstances may evidence unavailable during the administrative procedure (e.g. 
evidence which for objective reasons was impossible to obtain) be introduced in judicial 
review. In the majority of cases, problems with the assessment of evidence by the public 
authority are raised as submissions concerning procedural irregularity i.e. that the public 
authority was prevented from establishing the relevant facts on account of a breach of a 
procedural requirement. In such circumstances, courts must act carefully as their assessment 
of the evidence collected is constrained by their jurisdiction as a court proceeding in judicial 
review and they must not replace the discretionary assessment of evidence by the public 
authority with their own. 
 In extraordinary appeal before the Curia, submissions may be made only with regards 
questions of illegality and further assessments of evidence are excluded. The examination of 
evidence is excluded not because the jurisdiction of the Curia is limited to questions of 
illegality, but because statute excludes examining evidence in such procedures.
22
 It follows 
that the limited jurisdiction available to the Curia in extraordinary appeal does not itself 
exclude the taking of new evidence; it, nevertheless, necessarily constrains its scope and 
prevents the Curia from examining in this connection questions of merit. This indicates, 
although primarily with regards the issue of examining evidence in order to establish the facts 
of the case, that in Hungarian administrative law the judicial review of the legality of 
administrative action and the prohibition on courts in judicial review to second-guess public 
authorities could be separated conceptually. It must be noted, however, that its relevance is 
exclusively procedural, as it only limits the procedural instruments available to applicants, 
and from a substantive point of view, it does not question that the jurisdiction available in 
judicial review is determined completely by the prohibition for courts to address matters 
belonging to the substance of the administrative decision. 
 Following this discussion, we could summarize the central doctrine relating to the 
judicial control of administrative decisions brought within discretionary powers as allowing 
the judicial challenge of the use of administrative discretion in case it contradicts the file (i.e. 
it is based on an unlawful assessment of evidence) or it is unreasonable. Unreasonableness 
refers to the use of administrative discretion in breach of the rules of logic. Errors relating to 
the file (i.e. errors of fact) are examined within the review of discretion, however, as a matter 
of conceptual clarity it must be emphasized that this does not refer to errors in the 
discretionary assessment of evidence but to legal and procedural errors committed when 
taking evidence. Fundamentally, the judicial review of the use of administrative discretion 
stands for the judicial control of the reasonableness of administrative decisions. As stated 
earlier, the difference between appeal and judicial review follows from the prohibition of 
courts in judicial review substituting the assessment of public authorities with their own, 
which also has the impact of reducing the scope for courts examining evidence in procedures 
for judicial review.
23
 
 Finally, we need to distinguish between the judicial review of administrative decisions 
on grounds of their unreasonableness and their control on grounds expediency. Expediency is 
a matter which can be examined in applications for appeal. Expediency allows considering in 
the assessment of the reasonableness of the challenged administrative decision whether 
alternative decisional routes could have been followed under the discretionary powers 
available. This is not available in the judicial review of administrative discretion using 
unreasonableness as a head of review. As a result, in procedures for judicial review 
submission regarding the possibility of more reasonable, more optimal, or better 
administrative decisions than those challenged will be rejected, and only those will be 
examined by the court which allege that the use of discretion by the public authority was 
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manifestly unreasonable,
24
 i.e. the administrative decision contains a serious logical 
contradiction. This also follows from the prohibition of courts in judicial review interfering 
with the merit of the administrative decision. That constitutionally relevant prohibition 
excludes courts in judicial review disagreeing with the use of discretionary powers by public 
authorities as manifested in the administrative decision under challenge even in circumstances 
where it is evident that a better, more reasonable decision could have been reached. In certain 
circumstances this involves courts being prevented to assess the considerations governing the 
use of discretionary powers form a perspective or with a weight which is different from that 
selected by the administrative authority. In the contrary case, the administrative judge would 
be able to argue that its own assessment is more reasonable than that of the public authority, 
which is much different in its scope and intensity from courts examining whether the use of 
administrative discretion in the given case was unreasonable. This doctrinal position on the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction available in judicial review appears to be difficult to reconcile 
with the conduct required from courts under the principle of proportionality as it follows from 
the jurisprudence of the EU Court and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 
 
3 EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS 
 
In this section, we are going to provide a short overview of European legal requirements 
which influence the judicial review of administrative action on the domestic level. The most 
general requirement addressed to national courts in EU law can be found in Article 19(1) TEU 
which lays down the general clause of effective legal protection. This, as the corresponding 
principle/right to effective judicial review/protection before domestic courts,
25
 is aimed at the 
procedural and remedial arrangements in national justice systems. It requires that effective 
legal redress is available in the Member States for the protection of rights derived from EU 
law. The jurisprudence also recognizes more concrete requirements following from the right 
to effective judicial protection concerning ‘an individual’s standing and legal interest in 
bringing proceedings’ before national courts, the national provisions regarding which must 
meet, within the discretion available to the Member States in this connection, the general 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness developed in EU law.
26
 The autonomy of the 
Member States in regulating national procedures is expressly recognized in connection with 
the introduction of procedural measures for the protection of legal certainty
27
 and regarding 
the determination of the details of those rules in the context of national procedural law.
28
 In 
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particular, EU law allows the Member States to impose, in their discretion, reasonable time-
limits in national law for challenging final administrative decisions contravening EU law.
29
 
 The obligation of national courts to provide an effective protection of rights derived 
from EU law could follow from explicit clauses in EU legislation. The definition of that 
obligation in the jurisprudence would be based on the relevant legislative provisions.
30
 The 
Court has relied on the general principle and duty of consistent interpretation to secure that 
national courts observe the right to effective judicial protection by giving effect to provisions 
regulating the principle of access to justice (Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention) and by 
enforcing the corresponding objective of securing access to judicial review in order to 
challenge national administrative measures in breach of EU law.
31
 
 The principle of effective judicial protection addressed to national courts could be 
interpreted as an obligation to provide an effective remedy when national law prevents access 
to judicial redress or fails to secure an effective judicial redress under the scope of EU law.
32
 
The judgment in Johnston made it clear that access to judicial review must be provided to 
enable individuals ‘to pursue their claims by judicial process’ and receive effective protection 
from national courts.
33
 In Heylens, the EU Court recognized the right to a remedy of a judicial 
nature (the right to an effective judicial review) against decisions by national authorities in 
breach of EU law and argued that individuals must be provided ‘the best possible conditions’ 
to defend that freedom and must be able to decide on the basis of their knowledge of the 
relevant information whether ‘there is any point in their applying to the courts.’34 
 In the complex discussions in Unibet concerning the right to effective judicial 
protection, the Court insisted, regarding the question of whether a freestanding action should 
be made available under national law for the examination of compatibility of national 
measures with EU law, that the requirements of EU law should be observed when the 
remedies ‘which made it possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individuals' rights’ 
under EU law are not provided.
35
 The ultimate solution was found in the EU Court arguing 
that alternative avenues of judicial redress available in national law could secure the effective 
judicial protection of rights derived from EU law subject to the explicit reservation that 
offering only a single avenue for redress which requires individuals to breach the law to gain 
access to national courts and to face penalties as a consequence will not be accepted as an 
alternative.
36
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 The ruling in Europese Gemeenschap concerning the obligations of national courts 
under Regulation 1/2003/EC
37
 and the limitations on the jurisdiction following from the same 
measure indicated the broader institutional framework within which national courts need to 
construct their institutional identity and tasks. The Court discussed the respective roles of 
national courts, EU courts and the EU Commission in the enforcement of EU competition 
law, and it held that the right to an effective judicial redress is secured by the judicial review 
available before EU courts against the decision of the Commission and there is no need for 
procedures before national courts to meet the requirements arising from that right.
38
 
Regarding the limitations following from Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003/EC, the judgment 
highlighted that the said provision does not deprive national courts of their ‘full jurisdiction’ 
and in a claim for damages under EU law they remain free to assess the existence of loss and 
of a direct causal link between the loss and the anti-competitive practice in question.
39
 
National courts form part of the ‘complete system of judicial protection in the EU’40 
and they have been labelled as ‘the guardians’ of the EU legal order.41 Besides the above 
mentioned requirements, in relation to the action for annulment of EU measures before EU 
courts this position comes with the particular obligation of interpreting and applying, so far as 
possible, national procedural rules governing the rights of action before national courts so as 
to guarantee that individuals, who have been turned away by EU courts on account of the lack 
of locus standi, are able to challenge before national courts ‘the legality of any decision or 
other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general 
application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act’.42 This will then create the possibility 
for the national court to contest the validity of the EU measure in question before the EU 
Court in a reference for a preliminary ruling, which is regarded as an adequate alternative to 
the judicial avenue provided by the action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
43
 
EU law also contains principles which influence the substance of the supervisory 
jurisdiction exercised by national courts in judicial review. National courts, when the case 
before them falls within the scope of EU law, could be required to protect legitimate 
expectations
44
 and they must apply the principle of proportionality when controlling the 
decisions of administrative authorities and the sanctions imposed by them.
45
 The application 
of the proportionality principle entails examining, beyond the control of administrative 
decisions on the basis of the applicable legislative requirements, the question of whether the 
choice made by the administration within the discretion available to it was suitable, necessary 
and proportionate in the sense that it has struck a fair balance between the advantages and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
bring court proceedings to challenge a decision taken by the public authorities, where there is available to that 
individual a legal remedy which ensures respect for his rights and which enables him to obtain a judicial decision 
finding the provision in question to be incompatible with EU law. 
37
 Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1. 
38
 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap nyr., paras. 52-63. 
39
 Ibid paras. 65-67. 
40
 Inter alia Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23; Case 315/85 Foto-Frost 1987 ECR 4199, para. 
16; Case C-461/03 Gaston Schul [2005] ECR I-10513, Case C-131/03 P R.J. Reynolds [2006] ECR I-7795, para. 
40. 
41
 Opinion 1/09 The draft agreement on the European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137, para. 
66. 
42
 Case C-50/00 P UPA [2002] ECR I-6677, para. 42. 
43
 Ibid para. 40. See to that effect Case C-550/09 Criminal proceedings against E and F [2010] ECR I-6213, 
para. 45. 
44
 Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437; Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-
1591. 
45
 See, T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, Ch 4. 
disadvantages of the administrative decision.
46
 The proportionality principle could require 
courts proceeding in judicial review to examine whether the administrative authority could 
have reached a more suitable and/or less restrictive decision.
47
 The proportionality principle, 
especially this latter element, has been characterized as enabling courts to reach beyond the 
jurisdiction provided to them in judicial review under national law and interfere with the use 
of discretionary powers by public authorities beyond the examination of the reasonableness of 
the administrative decision.
48
 
Further, more concrete requirements concerning judicial review by national courts can 
be found in the judgment in Roquette Frères dealing with the judicial control of EU 
Commission investigatory powers available in the enforcement of EU competition law. 
Judicial review on the national level was discussed in the judgment as the jurisprudence 
identified national rules and guarantees as crucial safeguards for the protection of the right to 
private life in EU competition enforcement procedures.
49
 Concerning the effective supervision 
(judicial review) by national courts of coercive measures used in EU competition 
investigations in the territory of the Member States, the Court confirmed the obligation of 
national courts to contribute to the effectiveness of EU competition procedures and examined 
the limitations barring national courts from questioning the necessity of Commission 
investigations and their lawfulness and the power available to them to ensure that ‘the 
coercive measure envisaged is not arbitrary or disproportionate to the subject-matter of the 
investigation ordered.’50 
In this context, the EU Court distinguished between two scenarios. First, when the 
judicial review by the national court is carried out to examine whether the investigatory 
measures proposed are arbitrary, and second when the national court examines whether the 
investigatory measures concerned are disproportionate. Regarding the judicial review of 
arbitrary measures, the Court confirmed the requirement that national courts should control 
arbitrary coercive measures in EU competition investigations and examined how the 
Commission may facilitate the effectiveness of national judicial control for the protection of 
the rights of the undertaking concerned.
51
 The Court also urged national courts to assume a 
more autonomous role in applying EU law and to refrain from making preliminary references 
to the EU Court, which latter may hinder the effectiveness of the Commission's investigations. 
The judgment explicitly recognized the necessity for national courts to examine the 
proportionality of Commission investigatory measures. The EU Court also indicated the 
factors which need to be assessed by national courts in connection with the discretionary 
choices made by the Commission. They include the assessment of the seriousness of the 
suspected infringement, the nature of the involvement of the undertaking concerned or the 
importance of the evidence sought, and the ability of national courts to refuse in their 
jurisdiction to grant the coercive measure when the necessity to interfere with the rights of the 
undertaking concerned is minimal and the interference would be manifestly disproportionate 
and intolerable.
52
 
                                                          
46
 Inter alia, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 0649. 
47
 Inter alia, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
48
 See the discussion in English administrative law, inter alia, J. Jowell and A. Lester, ’Beyond Wednesbury: 
substantive principles of administrative law’ [1987] Public Law 368; J. Jowell and A. Lester, ‘Proportionality: 
Neither Novel Nor Dangerous’ in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), New Directions in Judicial Review, Stevens, 
London, 1988; I. Leigh, ‘Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act and Strasbourg’ 
[2002] Public Law 265. 
49
 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paras. 30-32 and 34-30. 
50
 Ibid paras. 51-52. 
51
 See ibid paras. 54-68. 
52
 Ibid paras. 77-80. 
From the law of the ECHR, Article 6 has presented the most significant influence on 
the judicial review of administrative action in the Contracting States.
53
 Article 6 ECHR lays 
down the right to a fair trial incorporating general and specific requirements, such as the 
fairness in conducting procedures, the rights of the defence and the requirement of a 
reasonable duration of procedures. As it follows from its wording, it applies fundamentally to 
judicial procedures in criminal and civil cases. However, Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
extended its application into certain judicial procedures under administrative law and there is 
an ongoing debate whether certain areas of administrative law, such as the enforcement of 
competition law where administrative authorities are endowed with serious investigatory and 
sanctioning powers, would fall under the criminal limb of Article 6.
54
 As we will see below, 
the requirement that Article 6 ECHR should be observed in procedures involving 
administrative and judicial phases as a whole led to the Strasbourg court formulating detailed 
requirements concerning the scope and intensity of judicial review in the Contracting States. 
Despite the extension of the application of Article 6 to areas covered by administrative law, it 
must be distinguished from the principle and right to good (fair) administration which in 
imposing fairness and quality requirements on administrative procedures takes into account 
the particularities of the procedural environment, especially the weight of the interest of 
administrative effectiveness and efficiency.
55
 
National courts also need to take into account that, in cases under the scope of EU law, 
Convention rights could be applicable in national law with the mediation of EU law. This 
follows from Articles 52(3) and 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which in essence 
require the rights of the Charter are interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with 
Convention requirements. In DEB, dealing with the liability of Member States in tort for the 
breach of EU law, the judgment gave much attention to the right to fair trial under Article 6 
ECHR and the relevant Strasbourg case law in interpreting the relevant EU legal principles 
with reference to their application in the particular domestic environment. The choice of the 
ECHR as the basis of the interpretative solution followed from the interpretative obligations 
following from the final provisions of the binding EU Charter.
56
 Article 6 ECHR had also 
been applied in connection with national provisions before the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. In Steffensen, national provisions regulating the admissibility of evidence in judicial 
procedures were subjected, among others, to the requirements emerging from right to a fair 
hearing under Article 6 ECHR. The Court established that beyond the general requirement of 
effectiveness national procedural rules adopted within the autonomy enjoyed by the Member 
States, if they fall under the human rights jurisdiction of the EU Court, also have to meet 
human rights requirements.
57
 
The Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to the application of Article 6 ECHR in 
administrative procedures has formulated far-reaching requirements concerning the scope and 
intensity of judicial review in the Contracting States. As it follows from standard case law, 
when the administrative procedure fails to meet the requirements of Article 6 ECHR the 
procedure as a whole may be found compatible with the ECHR provided that the 
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administrative procedure is followed by the opportunity to challenge any decision made 
against the person concerned in a procedure which offers the guarantees of Article 6 ECHR 
before a ‘judicial body that has full jurisdiction’.58 The latter condition was interpreted as the 
national court having jurisdiction to review and ‘quash’ (‘réformer’) all aspects, on questions 
of fact and law, of the administrative decision and examine all questions of fact and law 
relevant to the dispute before it. Although the jurisprudence accepts that the nature of 
administrative procedures can differ in numerous respects from the nature of criminal 
procedures, it maintains that this does not exonerate the Contracting States from meeting the 
requirements of the criminal limb of Article 6 ECHR.
59
 Regarding the jurisdiction exercised 
by the review court, the Strasbourg court held that national courts, although they may lack the 
jurisdiction to review the merit of administrative decisions, must be able to verify the legality 
of administrative action and review whether the use of public powers was appropriate, in 
particular, whether the sanctions imposed by the administrative authority were appropriate, 
and also to assess whether the court should annul or modify (‘remplacer’) those sanctions. 
Concerning the latter, it argued that the review court should be able to examine the logical 
coherence of the reasons supporting the decision and to provide a detailed analysis of the 
adequateness of the sanctions in the light of the applicable legal framework and the principle 
of proportionality.
60
 
As we can see from the short overview above, even on the level of rights and 
principles judicial review exercised by national courts is subject to requirements which 
affecting fundamental matters, such as the right of access to judicial review or the intensity of 
judicial review, reach down to the doctrinal basis of the jurisdiction available to national 
courts. The adjustments required are far from being revolutionary. The detailed assessments 
of the jurisdiction exercised by national courts, as in Roquette, or in Menarini and Segame 
were formulated in general terms and the requirements seem to have been selected so as to 
ensure their relatively unproblematic incorporation into domestic laws. This can be seen in 
how the judicial review of administrative discretion was conceptualized under Article 6 
ECHR as requiring that the appropriateness of the administrative decision is examined 
imposing more exacting requirements only in relation to the imposition of administrative 
sanctions. The principle of proportionality poses a more difficult challenge. The problem 
follows not only from the fact that the principle may be incompatible with the constitutional 
and doctrinal foundation of judicial review on the national level, but also from the possibility 
that in case the use of proportionality is restricted for doctrinal reasons to cases having a 
European dimension the unity and integrity of domestic administrative law will be 
jeopardized. The impact of Europeanization in this domain, therefore, must be carefully 
considered and national administrative laws may need to undertake a wholesale reassessment 
of their underlying doctrines in order to avoid breaching requirements following from the rule 
of law, such as legal certainty and equality. 
 
4 THE EUROPEANIZATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN HUNGARY 
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In the following, we are going to examine three areas in Hungarian administrative law where 
European influences have led to considerable adjustment or to considerable controversies. 
These are the law on procedural fairness and impartiality, the right of access to judicial 
review, and the review of administrative discretion by courts under the proportionality 
principle. The legal changes induced may not be spectacular and they may not have had a 
universal impact on domestic administrative law. Nevertheless, they indicate a recognizable 
fertilization of domestic administrative law with European elements and they reveal how 
Europeanization may cause tensions within domestic doctrine and law. 
 
4.1 FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
 
As we saw earlier, the right to a fair procedure before administrative authorities and before 
courts is recognized in the Hungarian Fundamental Law (Articles XXIV paragraph 1 and 
XXVIII paragraph 1 respectively). The latter is synonymous with Article 6(1) ECHR. The 
explicit constitutional distinction follows from the different functions of administrative 
authorities and courts in Hungary. Public authorities, when they proceed upon application or 
ex officio, serve the public interest and their task is to enforce the public interest against 
individuals. Typically, administrative procedures are launched ex officio, although in different 
areas of the administration this may be different,
61
 and they do not involve opposing private 
parties, instead they entail a procedure between a public authority and the individual. The 
purpose of ex officio administrative procedures is to establish whether the individual has 
committed an unlawful act, and because at the time the procedure is launched the unlawful 
conduct by the individual is assumed by the public authority, the impartiality of 
administrative procedures cannot be interpreted as an absolute constitutional requirement of 
procedural justice. The presumption of innocence is not observed in administrative 
procedures, and administrative authorities may only examine and take into account evidence 
and facts favouring the procedural position of the individual when legislation explicitly orders 
so.
62
 
 This does not mean that public authorities in Hungary would not have to observe 
certain requirements of procedural fairness. Some of these follow from domestic legislation 
and others from external sources, such as the jurisprudence of the EU Court. The Luxembourg 
case law has recognized a wide range of requirements of procedural justice including the right 
to a hearing,
63
 the right of access to the file,
64
 the duty to give reasons,
65
 the requirement of 
conducting the procedure within a reasonable time,
66
 the right to legal professional privilege
67
 
and the privilege from self-incrimination.
68
 Concerning the potential impact of European 
developments, it must be recalled that in Hungarian law the breach of procedural fairness in 
administrative procedures may only lead to the annulment of the administrative decision when 
the procedural error has had an impact on the merit of the case.
69
 This depends primarily on 
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the facts of the individual case and the progression of the relevant procedure, and it is not 
excluded that the breach of fundamental procedural guarantees will not lead in the 
circumstances of the given case to procedural irregularity which has affected the substance of 
the case. The possibility that submissions based on the breach of procedural justice will be 
ignored in judicial review before Hungarian courts could reduce the incentive to borrow from 
European law. 
 In general, procedural fairness could be conceived as a convenient head of review as 
the reviewing court may be able to avoid examining issues of substantive administrative law 
or the use of discretion by public authorities. Focusing on procedural lawfulness and fairness 
enables the assumption by the court that in case the procedure has been conducted fairly, i.e. 
the fundamental procedural guarantees were observed, the facts of the case were established 
on the basis of relevant evidence, the party had access to the file and exercised its right to be 
heard, and the legal arguments of the individual were refuted by reasons provided by the 
public authority (in other words, the reasoning provided revealed a reasonable administrative 
decision), it is likely that the administrative decision under challenge is also correct and fair in 
a substantive sense. With this, Hungarian administrative law, as other administrative laws in 
Europe, seems to recognize and operate following an assumed connection between the 
fairness of the procedure and the fairness of the decision reached in that procedure. 
 In the context of procedural justice in administrative law, Article 6 ECHR on the right 
to a fair trial in a reasonable time should, in principle, have had the most influence in 
Hungary. Article 6, as it follows from the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence discussed earlier, 
may apply in procedures before administrative authorities and it also formulates concrete 
requirements concerning the scope and intensity of judicial review before national courts. 
Hungarian law accepts that the procedure before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board of 
the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority falls under Article 6 ECHR. However, it has 
been consistent practice that Article 6 does not apply in procedures before the Competition 
Authority and the National Tax and Customs Authority. The case law of the Court of Human 
Rights, which having regard to the weight of the sanctions imposed has in individual instances 
declared the applicability of Article 6 in taxation and competition cases,
70
 has not been 
implemented in Hungarian law. This is explained by the consistency of long standing 
domestic judicial practice on this matter which either declares tax and competition cases as 
falling under the criminal limb of Article 6 and applies the requirements of fair criminal trials, 
or regards them as administrative cases and applies the requirements arising from the right to 
fair administration. In this latter case, Hungarian courts, rather controversially, ignore the 
Strasbourg case law arguing that the procedure falls outside the scope of Article 6 ECHR.
71
 
Courts proceeding in judicial review have consistently refused to apply Articles 6 and 8 
ECHR, the two provisions raised most frequently in applications in judicial review against 
decisions of the Competition Authority, in competition cases.
72
 This approach follows from 
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the judicial recognition of the criticism addressed against the Strasbourg case law which does 
not seem to distinguish adequately between natural and legal persons in the application of 
Convention rights, which should be offered under a human rights convention.
73
 
 The law, however, is not entirely consistent and, more importantly, judicial practice is 
not stationery. In a recent case, the Curia declared the mobile frequency auction procedure of 
the National Media and Infocommunications Authority as falling under the civil limb of 
Article 6 ECHR,
74
 and it rendered that provision and the relevant Strasbourg case law 
applicable and established its breach.
75
 The case concerned the Authority regulating as a 
precondition for incumbent service providers entering the auction procedure that they will 
have to undertake a domestic roaming service obligation in the prospective scenario of a new 
state owned mobile telecommunications operator entering the market. The measure in 
question did not regulate the possibility of such an obligation being open to legal challenge on 
grounds of its proportionality and justifiability. The Curia held that in this connection a 
separate administrative procedure should have been conducted in which the Authority would 
have been required to establish the lawfulness of imposing such an additional burden on 
incumbents. It argued that in the absence of that procedure the incumbent service providers 
had been prevented from exercising their right to legal redress and, as a result, their right to a 
fair trial was violated.
76
 
 Another significant change was the tying, as now recognized in the Fundamental Law, 
in Hungarian administrative law of the right to fair administration to the requirement of 
reasonable duration of procedures, which followed mainly from influence of the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg court.
77
 Traditionally, the reasonable duration requirement had only applied 
in judicial procedures, and administrative authorities had been bound only by the procedural 
time-limits laid down in legislation. In judicial practice, failing to meet the statutory time-
limits has never been regarded as a fault affecting the merits of the administrative decision, 
which would have led to its annulment. Nevertheless, the damages arising from such 
procedural errors have always been open to be vindicated in an action for damages against 
administrative authorities. 
 In previous practice, the requirements of fairness and reasonable duration in 
administrative procedures were always interpreted in the context of the statutory timeframe 
applicable in the procedure. This meant a reduced scope and intensity for judicial review 
where courts focused on the statutory boundaries and refused to scrutinize the fairness of the 
procedure beyond those bounds. The judicial control of procedural fairness was based on 
public authorities meeting objective, statutory time-limits and it did not address the question 
of what the reasonable duration requirement would demand in the circumstances of the given 
case.
78
 This judicial approach entrenched a doctrinal separation between the otherwise 
supplementary principles of procedural fairness and reasonable procedural duration. This also 
meant that administrative lawfulness could be conceptualized without having regard to the 
interest of administrative effectiveness. Administrative authorities, not being bound outside of 
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the legislative framework by a general requirement of administrative fairness, were able to 
assume that administrative lawfulness would necessarily entail administrative effectiveness 
and courts were unable argue that administrative lawfulness must be interpreted with 
reference to the demands of administrative effectiveness and that effectiveness considerations 
could be enforced over considerations inherent in the concept of fair and lawful administrative 
procedures. This position in light of the new constitutional provision could change. 
 The convergence of the right to fair administration and the right to a fair trial in 
Hungarian law following European patterns has led to legislation determining general 
procedural time-limits for courts proceeding in judicial review. Traditionally, legislation 
regulating judicial procedures had established time-limits only for certain procedural actions 
within the overall procedural framework before courts. This followed from standard judicial 
practice which regarded the use of general procedural time-limits as incompatible with the 
reasonable duration requirement because the reasonableness of the length of judicial 
procedures depends primarily on the circumstances of individual cases.
79
 The new time-limits 
are an indication of the increasing administrative character of judicial review and, perhaps, of 
the eradication of differences between the administrative and judicial function. The problem 
of enforcing the reasonable duration requirement through statutory procedural time-limits in 
procedures for judicial review is that it may jeopardize the lawfulness of judicial procedures 
in the same way as the reasonable duration requirement may jeopardize the effectiveness of 
the administration. The final destination of these legal developments is somewhat uncertain, 
and it is unclear whether the convergence of fairness requirements in the administration and in 
the judicial system will continue and what impact it will have on the capabilities of 
administrative systems and on the lawfulness of judicial decisions. 
 
4.2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND STANDING IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
In the interpretation of the standing condition that the applicant must have a legitimate interest 
in bringing an application for judicial review, the practice of Hungarian courts has been 
traditionally restrictive. This approach is also followed in environmental cases where, 
although the right of access to judicial review of environmental pressure groups has been 
recognized according to the Aarhus Convention, the determination of what constitutes an 
environmental case is based on a strict interpretation of Article 9(2) of that convention. These 
include cases dealt with in procedures conducted by the environmental authority, but not 
those concerning nature preservation, and procedures where the opinion of the environmental 
authority must be obtained before a final decision is reached.
80
 In case of large-scale 
construction projects, where a planning permission may only be issued after an Integrated 
Pollution Prevention Control licence has been obtained from the environmental authority, 
only the environmental licence is open to challenge in judicial review. This could mean that 
the planning permission will not be affected by the unlawfulness of the procedure conducted 
by the environmental authority. Hungarian practice also observes Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention and it applies the regular standing requirements in the cases listed therein. On this 
basis, cases concerning hunting rights and hunting licences are not considered as 
environmental cases, although after the judgment of the EU Court in 
Lesoochranárskezoskupenie VLK81 this interpretation may not be sustainable. 
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 A further questionable practice by Hungarian administrative courts is that they do not 
recognize economic interests, not even the interests of competitors in competition cases, as 
direct legitimate interests capable of securing standing in judicial review.
82
 This could 
contradict the requirements of EU competition law, when national authorities and courts 
proceed under the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and in case of regulated markets, 
such as telecommunications or energy, this restrictive interpretation of standing conditions 
could prevent economic operators seeking to protect their interests from challenging the 
decisions of regulators in judicial review and from exercising their right to effective judicial 
protection guaranteed by EU law. Pressure to reconsider domestic practice could also follow 
from the ruling in Streekgewest, where the EU Court held that an individual may have an 
interest in bringing procedures when that person seeks ‘to erase the negative effects of the 
distortion of competition’ created by an unlawful state aid, or when that person wants ‘to 
obtain a refund of tax levied’ in breach of EU law, irrespective whether he or she ‘has been 
affected by the distortion of competition’.83 
 Considerable change in the interpretation of standing conditions is expected from the 
recent reference for a preliminary ruling from the Curia concerning the definition of which 
persons may constitute parties to the administrative case in the area governed by EU energy 
(natural gas) law.
84
 Although, the term party ‘affected’ has been interpreted by the EU Court 
in telecommunications cases,
85
 the practice of the Court in the areas of electricity and gas has 
not provided a definition, especially, with regards decisions from national regulators 
confirming the operational and commercial codes of service providers (or determining their 
substance). The main issue in the preliminary reference is whether besides the system 
operator, on the request of which the code was published or on the request of which the 
decision confirming the code was modified, the gas supplier is also entitled to bring judicial 
review for protecting its contractual rights adversely affected by the administrative decision. 
The judgment of the EU Court could change the law, which in its current state excludes 
economic interests, such as the ability to enter into contracts with the system operator, from 
the range of legitimate interests recognized in the rules on standing and which unduly limits 
the standing of economic operators in judicial review. 
 
4.3 THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
 
We discussed earlier that in Hungarian administrative law the judicial control of 
administrative discretion covers only the judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of 
administrative decisions. The jurisdiction available in judicial review is constrained by the 
constitutional prohibition for courts to substitute the assessment of the public authority on the 
merits of the case with their own. The examination of evidence in judicial review may offer 
the possibility of a more intrusive judicial intervention, however, the jurisdiction available in 
this regard is subject to the same constitutional limitation. The law and the doctrine 
specifically exclude that courts examine alternative decisional pathways which may have been 
available for the public authority and they also prevent courts from identifying more 
reasonable decisions for closing the administrative case. In principle, the judicial review of 
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administrative discretion on the basis of the proportionality principle, as it follows from EU 
and ECHR law, seems incompatible with Hungarian doctrine and the related judicial practice 
and its use may only be legitimate, as a matter of domestic doctrine, if legislation explicitly 
enabled national courts to apply that principle in judicial review.  
 However, with Hungary’s European commitments in the Council of Europe and the 
European Union framework, domestic administrative courts have been increasingly 
confronted with the obligation of reviewing the use of discretionary powers by public 
authorities, affecting Convention rights or under the scope of EU law, by relying on the 
principle of proportionality. In this area, the domestic jurisprudence has recognized the 
applicability of the proportionality principle in a range of administrative cases. Proportionality 
has been used in cases determining whether the law had been breached by individuals, and in 
cases which concerned the adequate use of administrative discretion and which examined 
whether the appropriate sanction/penalty had been applied. The actual application of the 
proportionality principle, after its applicability has been established, seems to pose limited 
complications for Hungarian courts, although the quality and transparency of their reasoning 
in this context could improve. In a competition case dealing with the unfair manipulation of 
consumers, the questions were raised before the court whether the use of a product name 
capable of misleading consumers could be prohibited and whether imposing a re-labelling 
obligation on the economic operator affected would constitute a disproportionate interference 
with the sale of the product in Hungary. The product name was used in all other Member 
States of the EU and it stated that the product is the best available in the market. The court 
proceeding at first instance examined in detail the relevant case of the EU Court and held with 
reference to the facts of the case following a slightly condensed reasoning that establishing 
the breach of Hungarian consumer protection law did not constitute a disproportionate 
restriction of the free circulation of the product in question.
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 The parallel existence of European and domestic doctrine and legal principles, beyond 
the broader problem of separate bodies of administrative law and distinct modes of judicial 
review emerging in European and domestic cases in Hungarian administrative law, has caused 
considerable headaches to Hungarian courts in a recent case. Following a judgment of the EU 
Court in a procedure for preliminary ruling, they struggled with reconciling their obligation to 
review administrative sanctions on the basis of the proportionality principle, as it follows 
from EU law and from statutory provisions implementing the corresponding requirements of 
EU law, and the doctrinal prohibitions on substituting the assessment of the public authority 
regarding the severity of the penalty with their own and on reassessing the weight of the 
breach of law as determined by the public authority. In domestic doctrine, the judicial review 
of administrative penalties imposed under discretionary powers may only take place with 
reference to the statutory framework for imposing the penalty. As a result, courts would 
examine the statutory maximum and minimum amounts of penalties and they would volunteer 
to re-examine the assessment of the public authority only in exceptional circumstances, for 
instance, when the maximum penalty was imposed for insignificant breaches of formal legal 
requirements by individuals. 
The case itself was a relatively insignificant transport administration case, one of the 
many tachometer cases before Hungarian courts, where a fine of 100.000 HUF was 
challenged by the transport undertaking arguing that considering the weight of its unlawful 
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conduct (out of 15 tachometer disks one failed to indicate the arrival position of the 
speedometer) the sum of the penalty was excessive. The private party submitted this argument 
despite the fine having been imposed on the basis of objective legislative provisions which 
did not allow public authorities to depart in the circumstances of individual cases from the 
sum specified. The Hungarian court proceeding in judicial review turned to the EU Court for 
a preliminary ruling asking whether the objective imposition of fines contravened the EU 
requirement on the proportionality of penalties imposed under the scope of EU law. In Urbán, 
the EU Court ruled that while an objective (strict) system of fines (a ‘strict system of 
liability’) is prima facie compatible with EU law, the imposition of the fine in the particular 
case was disproportionate.
87
 It argued, among others, that ‘the amount of that fine is almost 
equivalent to the average monthly net income of an employee in Hungary. Consequently, the 
severity of the penalty appears, in the main proceedings, to be disproportionate to the 
infringement committed.’88 
The implementation of the judgment, because of the overlap of domestic and 
European principles, caused severe difficulties for the referring court. First, it was required to 
establish the illegality of the fine despite lacking jurisdiction under Hungarian law in this 
regard. As a matter of domestic law, the public authority acted intra vires on the basis of 
legislative provisions, which were held to be compatible with EU law, and it had no legal 
option other than to impose the exact fine determined in legislation. Although in such 
circumstances judicial interference with the administrative decision, under domestic doctrine, 
should be excluded, the referring court was obliged under EU law to declare the imposition of 
the fine on the basis of legislative provisions which allowed no discretion for public 
authorities as disproportionate. Second, it follows from the Court’s reasoning that, in 
principle, domestic courts are required to examine the proportionality of fines imposed under 
the scope of EU law on the basis of considerations not regulated in the relevant domestic 
legislation. The assessment of external considerations with regards the legality of the 
administrative decision represents a departure from domestic doctrine which enables judicial 
assessment only within the relevant legislative framework having regard, in particular, to the 
maximum and minimum amount of fines as relevant considerations. The judgment of the EU 
Court seems to suggest that the public authority should have taken into account considerations 
outside those listed in domestic legislation. Finally, it remains unclear whether following the 
judgment domestic courts are required, as a rule, to assess the proportionality of fines 
imposed under domestic law disregarding the relevant domestic legislative provisions. In this 
regard, it first needs to be clarified whether instead of the disproportionate application of the 
fine by domestic authorities the problem confronted in Urbán was that the EU requirement on 
proportionate penalties is unable to distinguish between legitimately introduced administrative 
sanctioning systems of different character.
89
 These are matters of fundamental constitutional 
importance from the perspective of domestic public law, which may not be fully appreciated 
in the current EU jurisprudence. 
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 It must be pointed out that the Court was indeed in a particularly position. It had to respect Member State 
autonomy in selecting the type of the administrative sanctioning system, but it also had to ensure that the 
applicable principle of EU law is observed. The compromise solution achieved may seem appropriate from the 
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 The suggestion that the proportionality of fines should be assessed on the basis of the 
average earning conditions in a Member State can be particularly problematic in a cross-
border perspective. For example, following the Court’s reasoning Hungarian heavy-goods 
vehicle drivers could, in principle, challenge the proportionality of objective fines imposed by 
public authorities in wealthier EU Member States for minor infringements of road transport 
regulations on the basis that Hungarian wages are considerably lower than average wages in 
that country. This raises the more fundamental dilemma of whether objective administrative 
sanctioning systems, which for legitimate reasons do not recognize the financial 
circumstances of individuals as a consideration relevant in the exercise of sanctioning powers, 
could satisfy the proportionality requirement in EU law. Objective fines will affect people 
with different financial means differently without offering a justification for different 
treatment. Arguably, the judgment in Urbán could be regarded as an indirect judicial 
indication that objective sanctioning systems applied in the Member States for the 
enforcement of EU law risk violating the proportionality requirement of EU law and that they 
should be ‘softened’ by the Member States by introducing elements which distinguish with 
sufficient clarity and preciseness between individuals in different circumstances despite the 
autonomy they enjoy in regulating domestic administrative law. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article revealed the pressures and changes experienced in the law and doctrine of judicial 
review in Hungary which followed from the European level. It identified gradual legal change 
and some resistance against European influences and it discussed the difficulties of grafting 
European requirements onto the domestic legal and doctrinal framework. Europeanization, as 
in other legal systems, has been partial and it seems that separate bodies of administrative law 
are emerging in European and in purely domestic cases. The uneven character of adjustment 
may necessitate further convergence which, however, should follow from domestic responses 
given to dilemmas faced on the national level. Further Europeanization could restore the 
integrity and coherence of Hungarian administrative law and it could remedy the unjust and 
illegitimate fragmentation of domestic administrative law under direct European influence. 
Moreover, taking Europeanization further could lead to domestic law reconsidering the 
constitutional mandate available to courts in judicial review and examining whether current 
law and doctrine ensure adequate judicial involvement in controlling the administration. Top-
down interference with domestic law, such as than in Urbán, may not be the right approach as 
it may lead to further conflicts between domestic and European law and doctrine. Instead, 
voluntary convergence facilitating change and bottom-up adjustment on the national level 
should be encouraged to achieve more fitting legal outcomes. 
 Voluntary convergence is particularly important when the tension between the 
jurisdiction available for domestic courts to review the use of administrative discretion and 
the European requirement of proportionality is attempted to be resolved. The introduction of 
proportionality to replace unreasonableness as a general principle in determining the intensity 
of judicial review in Hungarian administrative law would require the reassessment of current 
doctrine and the reconsideration of the role of courts in the scrutiny of administrative 
discretion. Compared to the ‘monolithic’ unreasonableness principle, which leaves a limited 
opportunity for courts to adjust the intensity of review to the circumstances of the individual 
case, proportionality could introduce into domestic law a more structured and nuanced 
assessment of what constitutes a rational administrative decision. Although the boundaries 
between the review of legality and the review of the merits of administrative decisions could 
become less certain, the principle of proportionality by requiring public authorities to provide 
more exacting justifications for their decisions, especially, when alternative decisions were 
available, and to defend the decisional route (and the choice between competing 
considerations) taken in light of the broader policy and governance context could enhance the 
role and relevance of judicial review and it would still keep judicial interference within its 
constitutional framework. This transformation, however, assumes a more defined position of 
courts in the system of administrative accountability and it requires that Hungarian law first 
explores the meanings and applications of the proportionality principle in the domestic 
setting, in particular, in comparison with unreasonableness principle. 
